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Chapter Six

Crossing a Rubycon? The International
Legal Framework for ISOs—Before and After
Privatization
Frans G. von der Dunk
I. Introduction
The present chapter analyzes the activities of international satellite organizations (ISOs),
former ISOs, and private satellite operators from the perspective of the four principal international space law treaties,1 consisting of the Outer Space Treaty,2 the Rescue and Return Agreement,3 the Liability Convention,4 and the Registration Convention.5 In addition,
it considers a United Nations Resolution dealing specifically with Direct Broadcasting by
Satellite,6 as it is one of the major categories of activities that international satellite organizations such as INTELSAT and EUTELSAT have traditionally undertaken, as well as the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which oversees the international regime
developed to deal with frequency issues.7
Analysis here will not deal with the general substance of these agreements, but only
with the specifics they may provide for dealing with ISOs, as opposed to sovereign states,
and ISOs now under private ownership. In particular, it will focus on the extent to which
the transition from ISOs to supervisory IGOs-cum-private operators marks a watershed.
While politically and economically this transition has often been characterized as a kind of
“crossing of the Rubycon,” the question remains whether legally speaking that would be
true as well.
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2. The Outer Space Treaty and Non-State Actors
Turning to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and its establishment of a baseline legal regime for
outer space activities including satellite communications, this Treaty very clearly distinguishes between state actors and non-state actors. The second category can then be further
subdivided into intergovernmental organizations and private operators.8 It is by addressing the crossing of the boundary between those two subcategories that some light might
be shed on the effects of the Treaty’s regime on the privatization process and vice versa, as
well as on the way hybrid entities should be addressed from this perspective. The same
general approach will also be followed with respect to the other treaties at issue, the aforementioned UN Resolution and the legal regime developed in the context of the ITU.
2.1. Intergovernmental Organizations and the Outer Space Treaty
The focus of the present analysis is on the privatization of a handful of organizations which
in their original versions, as will be seen, were clearly intergovernmental in nature: INTELSAT,9 INMARSAT,10 and EUTELSAT.11 While to that extent the analysis of intergovernmental organizations would also apply to such entities as INTERSPUTNIK12 and
ARABSAT,13 the absence of full-fledged privatization in the latter two cases causes them
to be absent from this analysis. Although INTERSPUTNIK has more recently moved to a
construct similar to the original structure of INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT,
where the actual satellite operators conduct the day-to-day management of the system as
opposed to the ruling body consisting of the states themselves, this level of “hybridization”
would still not qualify INTERSPUTNIK as a private operator.14
2.1.1. “Intergovernmental Organizations”
By way of Articles VI and XIII, the Outer Space Treaty contains two relevant clauses specifying that its regime applies to international intergovernmental organizations (“IGOs,”
which will be referred to as international satellite organizations or “ISOs,” wherever, in
view of the focus of the present analysis, IGOs undertaking satellite communication activities are specifically addressed), meaning that non-governmental international organizations (“NGOs”) are not considered by those clauses.15
Both clauses furthermore deal with specific consequences following from the fact that
relevant activities are carried out with the crucial involvement of an international intergovernmental organization. Interestingly, IGOs are viewed as mere platforms for individual states to cooperate, rather than as separate entities: the relevant cases are described as
“where . . . [activities in the exploration and use of outer space] are carried on within the
framework of international intergovernmental organisations.”16 This rather subordinated legal status of IGOs is furthermore confirmed by the second paragraph, where “practical
questions arising in connection with activities carried on by international intergovernmental organisations . . . shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the
appropriate international organisation or with one or more States members of that international organisation, which are Parties to this Treaty.”17
As such, states having a complaint about activities of an ISO are always entitled to refer
to one or more of the member states of the latter, in case they do not wish to deal with the
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ISO itself. This absence of a measure of true legal independence for ISOs in the international community of space actors is largely the result of reluctance on the part of the Soviet
Union at the time to grant IGOs such independent legal personality, and its insistence on
“classical” state sovereignty as the lynchpin for dealing with any legal issues pertinent to
outer space.18
The same limited status for ISOs emanates from the other key article here, Article VI,
which provides: “When activities are carried on in outer space . . . by an international organisation, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organisation and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such
organisation.”19 Responsibility of an IGO without the possibility to refer (also) to its individual member states, apparently, was not a feasible option.
In other words, the concept of an IGO, whether involved in satellite communications or
in other space activities, is clearly delineated, if not indeed defined, by its having sovereign
states as members. This conforms of course to the general public international law concept
of an IGO.20 As a consequence of such membership and the essentially public character of
its tasks, responsibilities, and activities, IGOs have an institutionalized system for participation of member state representatives,21 may be granted secondary competencies to conclude
international agreements of a treaty-like nature,22 and enjoy certain functional immunities
and privileges based on those of sovereign states and their diplomatic representations.23
Thus, in spite of their hybrid character (Public Telecommunication Operators and private operators, such as COMSAT or KDD, as signatories to the underlying operating agreements being in charge of the day-to-day running of the organization as well as providing
for the financing and the revenue-sharing mechanism), prior to their privatization INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT were undoubtedly IGOs in the sense of the aforementioned Articles VI and XIII of the Outer Space Treaty. These ISOs were all composed of
member states which were represented in the ultimate ruling body, and under whose control also the members of the chief governing body, consisting of representatives of the “signatories,” were designated.24 Also, they had Headquarters Agreements and related
Protocols on privileges and immunities in place with their respective host states: INTELSAT with the United States,25 INMARSAT with the United Kingdom,26 and EUTELSAT
with France.27
2.1.2. The ISOs Post-Privatization
The privatization process did not result in the complete elimination of IGO structures: INTELSAT as an ISO was replaced by the International Telecommunication Satellite Organization or ITSO,28 INMARSAT by the International Mobile Satellite Organization or IMSO,29
and EUTELSAT by EUTELSAT IGO.30 ITSO, IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO are still composed of member states as the ultimate bearers of competence to determine the legal structure, role, and personality of the organizations;31 and as such still undoubtedly qualify as
IGOs. These three residual organizations continue to enjoy functional privileges and immunities, especially in their respective host states of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.32
In fact, it is merely the scope of tasks and competencies of these ISOs which has been
greatly reduced when compared to their predecessors. With a view to the application of
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the Outer Space Treaty, however, this does raise the question of whether these new IGOs
are still materially impacted by the regime of the Outer Space Treaty, since Article VI
thereof is concerned with “activities in outer space” and Article XIII with “activities in the
use or exploration of outer space.”
ITSO’s main purpose is now simply “to ensure, through the Public Services Agreement
(PSA), that the Company provides, on a commercial basis, international public telecommunications services, in order to ensure performance of the Core Principles.”33 Article V of the
ITSO Agreement further defines that purpose as “supervision,” imposing a general obligation that “ITSO shall take all appropriate actions” to that end. Similarly, IMSO is “to
ensure that the basic principles set forth in this Article shall be observed by the Company,”34
and as for EUTELSAT IGO, “the primary purpose of EUTELSAT is to ensure that the Basic
Principles set forth in this Article are observed by the Company Eutelsat S.A.”35 These are all,
clearly, not “activities in outer space” in the sense of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.
By contrast, and as a consequence, in the case of ITSO “the international telecommunications satellite organization’s space system is transferred” to Intelsat,36 in the case of IMSO
it is Inmarsat which will henceforth operate the satellite system,37 whereas in the case of
EUTELSAT IGO, “Eutelsat S.A. will be established to operate a satellite system and to provide
satellite services and for this purpose, EUTELSAT’s assets and operational activities will be
transferred to the Company Eutelsat S.A.”38
2.2. Private Operators and the Outer Space Treaty
While the Outer Space Treaty does not use the term “private,” essentially because of the
aforementioned political issues the Soviet Union had with acknowledging legal personality of any other entities than states, it does without doubt encompass private actors in outer
space such as operators of telecommunication satellites in the broader term “non-governmental entities” of Article VI,39 as well as in the term “nationals” of Article IX.40
2.2.1. “Authorization and Continuing Supervision”
Article VI provides for the main requirement applicable here to private satellite communication operators with the clause stating that “the activities of non-governmental entities in
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorisation and
continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.” This clause is widely
perceived to provide the most fundamental basis for national space laws and/or licensing
systems for private space activities,41 noting at the same time that the precise definition of
“the appropriate state” is still subject to discussion.42 Several authors in addition have
claimed that, without such proper authorization and continuing supervision, private activities in space would actually be prohibited, as far as international space law is concerned, since Article I of the Outer Space Treaty expressly limits the freedom to explore
and use outer space to states.43
At the same time, Article VI determines that the state(s) whose national activities are
concerned would remain responsible in any event, effectively comprising such activities if
conducted by non-governmental entities on the same footing.44 Thus, in case those activities would transgress the boundaries set by international (space) law, the state(s) concerned would have to be addressed for repairing such an internationally wrongful act
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regardless of whether and to what extent such authorization and supervision had been
provided. This, obviously, would include private operators of satellite systems for communication purposes.45
Furthermore, it has been a comprehensive and uniform general practice for states not
to question whether private activities in outer space conducted by operators within the
jurisdiction of other states have actually been licensed by those states, nor is there any international custom of international public notification of granting such licenses. The resulting general absence of protests from states to cases where other states might have allowed
such private activities to go ahead without any specific license or authorization constitutes
a major argument for concluding that non-authorized and/or non-supervised activities do
not violate any rule of space law by the mere fact of such lack of authorization and/or
supervision.46
Indeed, it would seem impractical for other states to merely call a state to account for
not having (properly) authorized and/or continuously supervised certain private space activities if such space activities would not actually have violated substantive obligations
under space law. Hence, the more appropriate view would seem to be that the freedom for
states to explore and use outer space subsumes the corresponding freedom for their private
entities, even if not authorized and supervised; but under no circumstance would such an
absence of authorization and supervision detract from the state’s responsibility for the private space activities at issue, and actually would enlarge the extent of the violation of relevant treaty obligations.47 The absence of specific authorization and/or supervision from
such a perspective could be read as a blank approval by the state to conduct the activities
concerned, since it will be held responsible regardless; it (presumably knowingly) accepts
the risk that its responsibility will be invoked, yet has not chosen to develop and/or apply
any specific authorization and/or supervision regime.
It is once such activities come to be in violation of material rules of international (space)
law that states concerned would invoke the responsibility of the relevant other state(s) in
order to see the violation stopped and/or reparation provided. This key principle of international state responsibility goes back to the famous Chorzow Factory case of 1928, where
the Permanent Court of International Justice stated that the fundamental legal consequence
of state responsibility for an international wrongful act would be an obligation for the responsible state to provide for “reparation,” such reparation usually taking the form of either restitutio in integrum, compensation (usually in case only of material harm) and/or
satisfaction.48
2.2.2. ‘‘National Activities (in Outer Space)”
The other major issue debated in the context of Article VI and its application to private
actors concerns the scope of the concept of “national activities (in outer space).” Without
detailing the many discussions on the topic and the many definitions or circumscriptions
offered,49 the current status as regards the definition of “national activities” lacks clarity on
the international level. This leads those states that find themselves compelled to implement
the authorization and supervision clauses of Article VI by means of national laws and/or
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licensing systems to follow their own preference in applying such laws or systems to nationals (including companies with their respective nationality) and/or to anyone operating
from their territory, and/or through still other channels for exercising jurisdiction.50
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty refers to the more limited context where states are
aware “that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space . . . would
cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space,” in which case such states “shall undertake appropriate
international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.” In
other words, a specific obligation for states to consult with other states in certain scenarios
involving their respective national companies (including in cases of satellite communication activities) is added to the all-encompassing obligation to be held accountable for the
activities of those companies in case of transgressing the boundaries imposed by international (space) law in this respect.
2.2.3. The Private Character of Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat and Their Licensing
There can be no doubt that Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat are private companies. They do
not have a membership of sovereign states but are principally owned by shareholders
(among which may be found some public authorities, but in an essentially private capacity), and they do not enjoy any of the financing or immunity-related privileges that IGOs
can enjoy.51 This means they are to be authorized and supervised, as far as Article VI is
concerned, by “the appropriate State,” and under Article IX by the state whose “nationality” they carry (which under general international law used to refer to the state where the
private operator is incorporated and headquartered).52 Since in all three cases the state of
registration is identical to the state of headquartering, Intelsat (headquartered in Washington at least for its administrative and operational purposes, as was the old INTELSAT)
qualifies as a US company, Inmarsat (headquartered in London, as was the old INMARSAT) as a British one, and Eutelsat (headquartered in Paris, as was the old EUTELSAT) as
a French one.53 With respect to Intelsat, it should be added that essentially it was the administrative headquarters, including the satellite operational control functions, which remained in the United States,54 as the formal incorporation of the holding company has
recently moved to Luxembourg from Bermuda, a UK dependency where it was originally
established.
The United States thus applies its Communications Act of 1934,55 as amended by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, as the national act providing for authorization and supervision in the sense of Article VI, to Intelsat. The Act provides for a licensing obligation
of all persons using or operating “any apparatus for the transmission of . . . communications or signal by radio” from within the territorial or quasi-territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.56 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the US government
agency which authorizes and supervises US communications activities and operators, specifically declared in 1970 that the Communications Act was applicable to satellite communications.57
With reference to the two other countries formally involved in Intelsat, it should be
pointed out that Luxembourg, the country of formal incorporation of the parent holding
company,58 does not have a national space law yet, which essentially makes application of
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US national law as per the above undisputed. In the case of the United Kingdom, which
does have its Outer Space Act,59 there are no actual satellites deployed at the orbital locations and operating in the frequency assignments for which the United Kingdom serves as
the Notifying Administration at this time, leaving any potential role for the United Kingdom in this regard in a relatively passive state.60
In the case of Inmarsat, the United Kingdom does require Inmarsat to hold a license
under the UK Outer Space Act, as it obliges any UK operator procuring the launch of a
satellite, operating it or conducting any other activity in outer space to obtain a license in
accordance with its terms.61 In addition, in view of the telecommunication activities conducted by its space system, Inmarsat is also required to comply with any relevant requirements under the UK Telecommunications Act; the mere existence of a license under the
Outer Space Act does not take away such a requirement.62
As for France, the privatization or restructuring of EUTELSAT, resulting in the establishment of the French company Eutelsat S.A., presented a major reason for recently enunciating a national space law where none had existed before.63 The new Act obliges Eutelsat
to hold a French license, as it requires “any . . . juridical person carrying out a space operation” (which includes “ensuring the commanding of a space object during its journey in
outer space”), if such operator is of French nationality, to be authorized by the French authorities under the Law.64
2.3. The “Boundary” Issue under the Outer Space Treaty
From the above analysis, the essential boundary between application of the Outer Space
Treaty to ISOs and such application to private companies becomes clearly visible. The main
difference between the two categories under the Treaty itself, it may be noted, consists in
the requirements of authorization and continuing supervision under Article VI and of consultation in cases of potentially hazardous activities under Article IX as far as the latter is
concerned, although this may be more of a formal distinction. ISOs in practice will operate
under some system of authorization and possibly also supervision by their member
states—only, in this case, through their governing multilateral treaties and statutes instead
of through a single-state licensing process. Similarly, Articles VI and XIII jointly make clear
that states are also required to consult in appropriate cases targeted by Article IX since
ISOs are principally viewed as “frameworks” for state activities, not as independent actors
whose responsibilities are separate or to be separated from those of their member states.
In any privatization process, as far as such a formal distinction goes, the Rubycon is
crossed the moment the entities in question no longer consist of member states.65 At that
point in time, they come to fall under a single state’s international responsibility as opposed to the joint responsibility of the member states—in the case of Intelsat, the United
States; Inmarsat, the United Kingdom; and Eutelsat, France.
This single-state responsibility arises notwithstanding the continuing existence of ITSO,
IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO respectively and their exercise of legally entrenched control
and supervision activities over the three now private companies, as such control and supervision remain limited to a few explicitly delineated public interest aspects.
Thus, ITSO can “take all appropriate actions, including entering into the Public Services
Agreement, to supervise the performance by the Company of the Core Principles;” the
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legally binding PSA with the company being the principal instrument for ITSO to make
sure Intelsat will provide its services with “global connectivity and global coverage,” continue to “serve its lifeline connectivity customers” and “provide non-discriminatory access
to” Intelsat’s satellite capacity.66 Interestingly, at least for the first twelve years since privatization was realized the costs involved in running ITSO will be met “by the retention
of certain financial assets at the time of transfer of ITSO’s space system to the Company.”67
IMSO likewise has a Public Service Agreement in force with Inmarsat, spelling out the
details of the obligations of the latter subject to supervision and control by the former.68
The IMSO Assembly consequently is entitled “to take any steps or procedures necessary
to ensure observance by the Company of the basic principles, as provided for in Article 4,
including approval of the conclusion, modification and termination of the Public Services
Agreement under Article 4(1).”69 These basic principles oblige Inmarsat to ensure the continued provision of global maritime distress and safety satellite communications services,
to provide services without discrimination on the basis of nationality, to act exclusively for
peaceful purposes, to serve—at least in principle—all areas where there is a need for mobile satellite communications, giving due consideration to the rural and the remote areas
of developing countries, and to operate in a manner consistent with fair competition.70 Also
IMSO is essentially funded by the company it is charged to supervise and control, at least
to the extent of costs concerning the “establishment and operation of the Secretariat; the
holding of Assembly sessions; and the implementation of any measures taken by the Organisation in accordance with Article 4 to ensure that the Company observes the basic
principles.”71
Finally, EUTELSAT IGO once again has largely followed the path of ITSO, although
here the Public Services Agreement has been labeled “Arrangement,” defined as “the Arrangement between EUTELSAT and the Company Eutelsat S.A. having as its purposes to
define the relationship between EUTELSAT and the Company Eutelsat S.A. and their respective obligations and in particular to provide the framework that will enable EUTELSAT to oversee and ensure the observance by the Company Eutelsat S.A. of the Basic
Principles.”72 These Basic Principles pertain to universal service obligations, pan-European
coverage by the satellite system, nondiscrimination, fair competition, and due adherence
to rights and obligations under international law such as the ITU Radio Regulations for the
use of frequencies deriving from the operation of the space segment transferred from EUTELSAT IGO to Eutelsat.73 EUTELSAT’s main organ, the Assembly of Parties, consequently has the mandate inter alia “to consider and to review the activities of the Company
Eutelsat S.A. which relate to the Basic Principles,” “to ensure observance by the Company
Eutelsat S.A. of the Basic Principles, in accordance with the Arrangement” and “to take the
appropriate decisions in order to ensure continuity regarding rights and obligations under
international law” as referred to before.74 Also in the European context, the company basically has to pay: “The costs incurred in establishing and operating the Secretariat, including, but not limited to rent and associated costs of maintaining office premises, salaries and
emoluments of staff, costs of organising and holding meetings of the Assembly of Parties,
the costs of consultations between EUTELSAT and the Parties and other organisations and
costs of applying measures taken by EUTELSAT under Article III to ensure that the Basic
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Principles are observed by the Company Eutelsat S.A. shall be borne by the Company Eutelsat S.A. in accordance with paragraph a) of Article V, within the relevant ceilings set
forth in the Arrangement.”75
Thus, it may be concluded that in each case crossing the Rubycon toward privatization
has resulted in the new operators now being subjected to formalized and explicit requirements as to their key international public duties, accompanied by substantial legal and
jurisdictional tools for the revamped IGOs to ensure conformity with those requirements.
By contrast, in the context of the ISOs prior to privatization such public duties were considered to be sufficiently guaranteed by the control of the totality of their member states
through the governing bodies.
The explicit character of those public duties and the need to preserve them in a privatized environment may well turn out to be an interesting development not only in the specific
context of those respective IGOs and former ISOs but also for the broader development of
international space law, if only because the conflicts between commercial interests and
general public interests are now more likely to lead to proper legal disputes requiring legal
solutions, as opposed to being dealt with at an international political (member state) level.
At the same time it should be reiterated that the United States, the United Kingdom,
and France remain the primary addressees of any question of legality of the operations of
Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat respectively. Beyond the core public duties addressed in
the Public Service Agreements—which essentially concern entitlements for (certain) member states of ITSO, IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO—these three states will be held accountable
by third-party states. Here also any such disputes would more readily be handled in
proper legal terms in view of the applicable domestic regimes of authorization and continuing supervision, including national space law.
3. The Rescue Agreement and Non-State Actors
3.1. Intergovernmental Organizations and the Rescue Agreement
Where the Outer Space Treaty specifically mentioned intergovernmental organizations yet
did not acknowledge or grant them any substantive measure of independent legal personality, in elaborating Articles V and VIII thereof76 the Rescue Agreement went one step further with a view to IGOs. It provided namely that “for the purposes of this Agreement, the
term ‘launching authority’ shall refer to . . . , where an international intergovernmental
organisation is responsible for launching, that organisation,” if three further conditions
would be fulfilled:77 (1) the majority of the IGO’s member states being parties to the Outer
Space Treaty; ( 2) the majority of the IGO’s member states being parties themselves to the
Rescue Agreement; and (3) the IGO issuing a formal declaration of “its acceptance of the
rights and obligations provided for in this Agreement.”78 Since the concept of the “launching authority” pointed to the entity principally enjoying the rights proffered by the Agreement,79 this clause essentially allowed ISOs to become, to a considerable extent, equated to
states for the purpose of the Agreement’s regime.
Neither INTELSAT, nor INMARSAT, nor EUTELSAT, however, have issued such a declaration;80 in any case where these ISOs would have been interested in recovering a satellite
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they would have had to call upon one or more of their member states, or through the contract with the launching authority upon such authority, to ensure these interests were being recognized and respected. This situation has persisted with ITSO, IMSO, and
EUTELSAT IGO after the privatization of the operators was finalized, although the lack of
direct involvement of these IGOs with the satellites and satellite operations themselves
makes this a rather theoretical point.81 It would be hard to derive from the roles of ITSO,
IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO a status of “launching authority,” which after all is defined as
being “responsible for launching” of the satellite at issue.82 As following from earlier analysis, ITSO, IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO now act in a purely reactive mode to decisions on
launching and operating satellites that are made by Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat—and
then only to the limited extent of ascertaining their compliance with certain international
public duties.
Finally it should be noted that the equation of IGOs to states for the purpose of the
Rescue Agreement is limited to the substantial obligations related to (rescue and) recovery
of astronauts and spacecraft; the concept of the “launching authority” does not play a role
in the context of any procedural issues such as the possibilities to amend the Rescue Agreement.83
3.2. Private Operators and the Rescue Agreement
Contrary to the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement does not make any reference to
private parties, not even under a broad concept of “nongovernmental entities.” In addition
to the general lack of perception that private enterprise might be interested in space activities and the political resistance of the former Soviet Union to legal recognition of private
space activities, the absence of any reference to private parties was also due to the focus of
the Agreement on manned spaceflight and assistance to astronauts, where such participation was expected least of all.84
For private operators, this means that relevant legal rights and obligations are completely subsumed under those of the contracting state concerned as “launching authority,”
consistent with the general approach on this set forth in particular in Article VI of the Outer
Space Treaty.85 In addition, the Rescue Agreement has been argued above to essentially
constitute an elaboration of two specific Articles of the Outer Space Treaty.
As a consequence, on the side of claiming rights under the Agreement, the state(s) qualifying as the launching authority(ies) for a telecommunication satellite would have to take
up the cause of the private operator in case the latter is seeking, for example, for return
and recovery of its satellite. For Intelsat, at least the United States would be such a “launching authority” and “contracting party,” for Inmarsat the United Kingdom and for Eutelsat
France.
In addition, however, possibly one or more other states might also qualify as “launching
authority.” Take the example where Intelsat would choose to launch one of its satellites
from Bajkonour, a Russian facility located on the territory of Kazakhstan. The concept of
the “launching authority” has not been defined by the Rescue Agreement beyond the state
or IGO “responsible for launching.”86 Noting however that most experts tend to blend the
notion of “launching authority” with the later one of the “launching state,” which has been
defined by the Liability and Registration Conventions in greater detail,87 any launch from
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Bajkonour would make both Russia and Kazakhstan launching states and therefore might
also qualify them as launching authorities for the purpose of the Rescue Agreement.
The only problem here would be that the Rescue Agreement throughout refers to the
concept of “launching authority” explicitly in the singular . With, in the example given, the
United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan effectively all sharing the “responsibility” for the
launch, under a strict interpretation the question would arise which state would be the
“most responsible” one so as to most logically qualify as the launching authority.88 Or
should the explicit singularity of the “launching authority” be considered effectively overridden, outdated by later developments regarding the possible plurality of the “launching
state” under the Liability and Registration Conventions?89
On the other hand, for those private operators that would find themselves confronted
with complaints emanating from obligations following from the Rescue Agreement, the
launching authority would be the relevant contracting party to the Agreement to defend
against legal claims, although this would be largely theoretical. Private operators would
not likely become involved in scenarios where they would be able to play a substantial role
in “rescuing” or returning a satellite. At best, it could be imagined that a satellite operator
would be the first to receive or discover “information . . . that the personnel of a spacecraft
have alighted on the high seas or in any other place not under the jurisdiction of any State,”
triggering the relevant obligations for the contracting party.90
In such cases, it would seem to be exclusively the United States in respect of Intelsat, the
United Kingdom in respect of Inmarsat, and France in respect of Eutelsat which would be
held to answer such claims, although it could not be excluded that, for example, the operation of a particular Inmarsat satellite conducted from US territory might trigger US responsibility in addition to that of the United Kingdom. The concept of “national activities”
determines the scope of the international responsibility addressed by Article VI of the
Outer Space Treaty, and such “national activities” could very well encompass, next to activities conducted by nationals of the state concerned (the United Kingdom in the case of
Inmarsat), activities conducted from the territory of another state concerned (in this example the United States).91
3.3. The “Boundary” Issue Under the Rescue Agreement
In the absence of any reference to private operators or non-governmental entities and with
“international intergovernmental organisations” for the purposes of the Agreement defined in no greater detail than precisely by the reference to “intergovernmental,” the crucial dividing line between IGO/ISO and private operator remains the same as that
discussed with respect to the Outer Space Treaty.92 INTELSAT, ITSO, INMARSAT, IMSO,
EUTELSAT, and EUTELSAT IGO thus all respectively qualify as IGOs for the purpose of
the Rescue Agreement, whereas Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat clearly do not.
The main result of the privatization process in this context then is that the actual operators of the three satellite systems since being privatized can no longer claim rights of recovery and return directly even in theory, as dependent upon a relevant declaration under
Article 6, but now in any case would require their respective launching authority (or
launching authorities) to do so.
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In addition, they would not be held directly responsible under international space law
for any possible violations of the relevant obligations, in this case referring to issues of
rescue, recovery, and return. However, as discussed above, when it comes to possible violations of any rules of space law under the Outer Space Treaty, in the case of an ISO there
would always be a residual responsibility for those states members of the ISO, so that the
difference in that respect would not be very substantial.
4. The Liability Convention and Non-State Actors
4.1. Intergovernmental Organizations and the Liability Convention
The Liability Convention is generally perceived to constitute an elaboration of Article VII
of the Outer Space Treaty, establishing a more detailed set of liability rules based upon the
fundamental principle of liability created by it.93 The Convention specifically refers to “international intergovernmental organizations” in just two of its clauses: one on the specific
issue of definition of damage compensable under the Convention,94 the other having a fundamental effect on the scope of the Convention ratione materiae rather akin to the formula
of Article 6 of the Rescue Agreement.
4.1.1. The secondary Status of IGOs under the Convention
As to the latter, Article XXII(1) of the Liability Convention provides: “In this Convention,
with the exception of Articles XXIV to XXVII, references to States shall be deemed to apply
to any international intergovernmental organisation which conducts space activities if the
organisation declares its acceptance of the rights and obligations provided for in this Convention and if a majority of the States members of the organisation are States Parties to this
Convention and to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” Member
states of an IGO, furthermore, are charged specifically with trying to get that IGO to make
such a declaration.95
The Convention thus requires the same three conditions to be fulfilled as in the case of
the Rescue Agreement. Further, like the Rescue Agreement, the “partisanship” of an IGO
in its own right is limited to the substantive rights and obligations, where Articles XIV
through XX deal with the Claims Commission as the dispute settlement mechanism offered by the Convention to states parties. Article XXI deals with the possible need to render
assistance in case of large scale dangers to human life and Articles XXIII through XXVIII
deal with procedural issues and formalities.96
More clearly than in the Rescue Agreement, however, the legal personality potentially
granted to ISOs is of a secondary nature. When the ISO in its quality of “launching state”97
has become liable for damage caused by its space object, any claim for such damage should
be addressed firstly to the organization itself, yet in a second instance, “where the organisation has not paid, within a period of six months, any sum agreed or determined to be
due as compensation for such damage, . . . the claimant State [may] invoke the liability of
the members which are States Parties to this Convention for the payment of that sum.”98
Six months, however, is not a terribly long period for an ISO to deal with an international
liability claim under the Liability Convention.
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In other words: behind the “surface” liability of an ISO there would always lie a “baseline” liability of the individual member states; such states can never use the ISO as a shield
against any obligation to see the victim duly compensated and would be instead be incentivized to arrange for a proper handling of such claims in the context of the IGO prior to
such event.99 Such arrangements would have to deal most importantly with questions (1)
regarding contributions to any liability claim to be paid by an ISO by those of its member
states not parties to the Liability Convention (and hence to that extent not under a selfevident obligation to carry their share of the ISO’s liability), and (2) whether the proportionality criterion to be used for such cases should refer to the overall respective contributions made to the ISO, the respective contributions made to the particular satellite, a
general calculation of GNP or any combination of those and/or other criteria. Thus, if the
ISO is unable to pay the claim directly, the victim could still seek compensation from the
member state.
On the other hand, if an ISO would become the victim of damage compensable under
the Convention, its legal status is even more secondary, as “any claim, pursuant to the
provisions of this Convention, for compensation in respect of damage caused to an organisation which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article shall
be presented by a State member of the organization which is a State Party to this Convention.’’100
Clearly, an ISO is not an autonomous entity whose intergovernmental composition is
irrelevant, presenting a public version of a “corporate veil” hiding the individual interests
of the “shareholders.”101 As seen before in the context of Articles VI and XIII of the Outer
Space Treaty, the ISO in such cases is considered in essence to be a vehicle for a number of
states to act collectively, stimulating states to use it also as a vehicle for dealing with joint
liabilities for the activities of the ISO.
4.1.2. The Special Case of EUTELSAT IGO
Among the three original ISOs which are the object of current analysis, EUTELSAT is the
only one to have actually declared its acceptance of rights and obligations under the Liability Convention by means of a relevant declaration.102 While that declaration may persist
also with respect to the EUTELSAT IGO which took the place of the old “EUTELSAT,”103
it remains to be seen what this means in light of the fact that any space operations of note—
the kind of activities potentially triggering application of the Liability Convention—have
been transferred to Eutelsat in the course of the privatization process.
On the “defendant-side,” with a view to the definition of the “launching State,” applicability of the Convention could only become an issue to the extent that EUTELSAT IGO
would itself “procure” the launch of another satellite on behalf of Eutelsat.104 Such a situation, however, would now be highly unlikely, as the main legislative efforts driving privatization of the ISOs called for operational independence of the private operator from the
supervising public entity. For Europe, the 1994 EU Satellite Directive required full-fledged
privatization of the ISOs inter alia through deletion of any special or exclusive rights, state
aids of any sorts as well as other benefits IGOs could derive from such a status.105 Likewise,
for the United States the 2000 ORBIT Act106 required privatization to be comprehensive in
order to allow fair competition of the privatized former ISOs with private operators that
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did not evolve from ISOs, such as PanAmSat, which had lobbied vehemently with the US
government to get it to ensure a level playing field in those respects.107
On the “claimant-side,” EUTELSAT IGO by its declaration would still qualify as an IGO
entitled under Article XXII of the Convention to the rights and duties of states under the
Convention, but, as discussed, for assertion of a claim for compensation of damage suffered, it would depend upon a member state. The sole difference being that, were EUTELSAT IGO to be treated as the entity itself suffering damage (namely “through” the private
operator it is monitoring following the privatization of the operations, as if by proxy), any
EUTELSAT IGO member state could be called upon to assert a claim on behalf of Eutelsat.
However, if such damage could not be legally constructed so as to give rise to implementation of the EUTELSAT declaration, only France (as the state of nationality of Eutelsat)
would be entitled to put forward such a claim.
4.2. Private Operators and the Liability Convention
Like the two other space treaties discussed so far, the Liability Convention does not specifically refer to private enterprise, although it does make reference to “juridical persons”
a few times in the context of defining compensable damage under the Liability Convention.108
4.2.1. The Proper Place of Private Operators under the Convention
On the “liability-side,” as a consequence of the four criteria to become a liable entity defined as “launching State” (every “State which launches or procures the launching of a
space object . . . [or] from whose territory or facility a space object is launched” qualifies as
a “launching State,” and hence is liable for damage caused by the space object concerned
under the Convention)109 no measure of private involvement in the space object concerned,
whether it concerns its manufacture, its launch, its ownership, its operation, or its usage,
is relevant at the international level. Regardless of such private involvement, a particular
state will be held liable under the Liability Convention once it qualifies as a launching state,
and whether and to what extent it would be able to have recourse to any private entity
involved is not a matter of the Convention itself, or for general international law for that
matter.
The Liability Convention, in contrast to the Rescue Agreement and its concept of “launching authority” as discussed before, allows for multiple states to qualify as a “launching
state,” and specifically establishes joint and several liability in cases where more than one
state qualifies as such.110 Thus, if Intelsat were to launch a satellite from Bajkonour, the
United States as well as Russia and Kazakhstan would qualify as launching states. The
resulting joint and several liability is a matter for the states concerned to deal with. For
example, Russia and Kazakhstan have concluded an ongoing agreement that any liability
claims addressed at Kazakhstan as a consequence of Bajkonour-launches will be reimbursed by Russia.111 This bilateral inter-party arrangement, however, clearly cannot derogate from the liability as such of Kazakhstan under the Liability Convention.
The issue of reimbursement by the private operator, the de facto “causator” of the damage (as well as the establishment of other means of legal control over, and involvement
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with, such private participation) as a consequence of the definition of the liable entity (entities) through the concept of the “launching state” becomes a matter of domestic action.
Notably, this would take the form of the drafting of national space legislation or national
licenses providing for a reimbursement obligation, and—if considered requisite—attendant
obligations of financial security, insurance, technical, and operational expertise, and appropriate other measures to limit the opportunities that damage would actually be caused.
And indeed, in a number of instances individual states have taken care to oblige satellite
operators (as well as other private companies active in outer space so as to run the risk of
causing damage compensable under the Liability Convention) (1) to take out a license before being allowed to commence or continue their activities; ( 2) to accept in such a license
the obligation to reimburse the licensing state for claims the latter might have to pay out
under the Liability Convention, either without or up to a limit; and (3) to insure, at least
up to a certain amount, against such a reimbursement obligation.112
The Liability Convention, however, by its approach to handling liability, gives rise to a
peculiar situation here: essentially it is not a space activity causing damage in a particular
case which leads to the liable entity or entities, but the space object involved in that activity,
where the launch then points to the liable entity or entities.113 That complete focus on the
launch, however, and on the state(s) crucially involved therein as per the fourfold criterion,
essentially means “once a launching state, always a liable state.”114 In turn, in domestic
legal mechanisms devised to handle such liability in cases of private involvement, the focus will be largely on such involvement in the launch, as opposed to, for instance, the satellite operations themselves.
4.2.2. Private Operators (Such as Intelsat) and US National Space Law
This is most clear in the US case, relevant to Intelsat, as the United States has different
licensing regimes for private involvement in launching (and other forms of space transportation), satellite communications,115 and satellite remote sensing,116 respectively, whereas the
regime providing for liability-reimbursement and related insurance obligations is incorporated exclusively in the first-mentioned regime.
Here, the Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988, now codified in their
latest rendition as part of the United States Code,117 provided that anyone licensed under
the Act “shall obtain liability insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility in amounts
to compensate for the maximum probable loss from claims by . . . a third party for death,
bodily injury, or property damage or loss resulting from an activity carried out under the
license.”118 That insurance is to cover inter alia the US government against such claims as
may arise under the Liability Convention.119 The “maximum probable loss” referred to in
this key clause is to be determined by the Secretary of Transportation (read the Office of
the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation as mandated by the former), but any possible amount to be derogated under this concept would be capped by
either “the maximum liability insurance available on the world market at reasonable cost”
or US$500,000,000, whichever is the lower.120
Most importantly, however, the particular licensing obligation entailing such further
responsibilities applies only to anyone wishing “to launch a launch vehicle or to operate a
launch site . . . in the United States,” as well as any “citizen of the United States . . . [wishing]
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to launch a launch vehicle or to operate a launch site . . . outside the United States”—not, for
example, to someone only operating the satellite launched and/or having ordered such
launch.121
Any private satellite operator, even if a US company in legal terms (like Intelsat) and
operating its satellites from US soil (as Intelsat at least partially does), would at best come
in touch with these rules indirectly. This would occur namely only to the extent it would
have its satellites launched by an operator that is subject to the above licensing requirements, and may wish to derogate, as part of the launch contract, (part of) those liabilities
to the satellite operator. Most likely, relevant provisions would focus on damage caused
as a consequence of negligence or gross negligence on the part of the launch provider alternatively satellite operator, noting that the baseline standard of practice in such contracts
is a cross-waiver of liability, or on cases where the damage was caused unequivocally after
the launch phase had ended and the satellite was on its own. Ultimately, however, whatever provisions end up in the contract are a matter of negotiation between the two contractual partners, not a matter of international or (generally speaking) of national space law.
4.2.3. Private Operators (Such as Inmarsat) and UK National Space Law
In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom and France have single “framework”
acts dealing ratione materiae with the comprehensive range of space activities, including
satellite operations. Inmarsat, a body “incorporated under the law of any part of the United
Kingdom,” not being a launch provider itself has to procure the launches of its satellites
by launch service providers (whether these are governmental or private), yet under the UK
Outer Space Act it does indeed require a license for each such activity.122
The Outer Space Act then also imposes upon the licensee the obligation to “indemnify
Her Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom against any claims brought against the
government in respect of damage or loss arising out of activities carried on by him to which
this Act applies.”123 As for insurance, it is left to the licensing authorities to impose such an
obligation as well as any limit to it.124 At the policy level it has become standard practice to
impose such an obligation, with moreover a standard cap on third-party liability insurance
being applied of (currently) some €60,000,000, some US$80,000,000 at today’s rates.125
In view of the aforementioned focus of the international liability regime as per the Liability Convention on the launch for the purposes of determining liability, it may appear
unlikely that the UK authorities would impose such an insurance requirement for a satellite operator (as opposed to a launch operator) without further ado.
However, the reference to “procurement” of a launch as itself requiring a license under
the Act may signify that the procurement of a launch by a private UK company such as
Inmarsat should be read as procurement of that launch by the United Kingdom itself, making that state liable under the Liability Convention in case damage would be caused by the
satellite thus launched. To be sure, Article I(c) sub (i) of the Liability Convention speaks of
“a State which . . . procures the launching of a space object”; yet many experts would hold
the reference to “a state” to include any private company subsumed under that state, in
line with the general equation by Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty of private activities
with governmental activities for the purpose of international space law.126 Consequently,
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Inmarsat may indeed be required under its license to take out insurance, essentially because the UK authorities do not exclude the possibility that their liability may be called
upon internationally so as to lead to the obligation to compensate damage caused by an
Inmarsat satellite.
4.24. Private Operators (Such as Eutelsat) and French National Space Law
Similarly in France, Eutelsat would be subject to a licensing obligation, as there is no doubt
that the company qualifies as a “juridical person whose headquarters are located in France
. . . intending to procure the launching of a space object” in addition to being a “French
operator intending to command such an object during its journey into space.”127 “Operator” is defined as “any natural or juridical person carrying out a space operation under its
responsibility and independently,” whereas the term “space operation” includes “any activity consisting . . . of ensuring the commanding of a space object during its journey in
outer space.”128
Under Article 4 of the Law on space activities, Eutelsat has to be pronounced financially,
professionally, and technically healthy by the French authorities in order to have a request
for a license positively considered. More importantly, it has to “have and maintain, as long
as it can be held liable pursuant to Article 13 and for the amount set out in Articles 16 and
17, insurance or another financial guarantee,” which “must cover the risk of having to
compensate for the damages that could be caused to third parties” up to the relevant
amount, and must cover inter alia “1° The Government and public bodies; 2° The European
Space Agency (ESA) and its Member States; 3° The operator and the persons having taken
part in the production of the space object or in the space operation”—of course each to the
extent these may be faced with claims for compensation.129 The reference to ESA and its
member states under 2° takes into account in particular the potential for Arianespace
launches to lead ESA and/or its member states to become liable,130 whereas the reference
under 3° covers inter alia product liability at the international level, something not as such
addressed by the Liability Convention. Interestingly, Article 15 allows operators from
other member states of the European Union (plus those of the European Economic Area)131
the same possibility as a French operator to avail itself of the maximum liability arrangements under a license.132
In view of the quoted reference to Article 13, Article 6 essentially reiterates some of the
provisions of the Liability Convention regarding absolute versus fault liability as well as
exoneration. Articles 16 and 17 provide the French authorities with the ability to limit the
indemnification for damage caused during the launching phase respectively thereafter.
Finally, Article 14 ensures that the French government, if found liable, will be reimbursed by the licensee up to the maximum amount applicable under Articles 16 or 17. Interestingly, that assurance not only applies to international liability claims under the
Liability Convention, but also to such claims under the Outer Space Treaty. This suggests
that France at least does not wish to exclude the possibility that a third state would like to
claim not on the basis of the Liability Convention (and therefore effectively also not on the
basis of Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty)133 but on the basis of Article VI.134
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Apparently, therefore, the mere conduct of space operations by Eutelsat, without these
necessarily leading to qualification of France as a “launching state” may, if causing damage, from the French perspective still lead to a claim for compensation, as “reparation” for
the consequences of “national activities in outer space” attributable under Article VI to
France.
Take, for instance, the situation in which Eutelsat would buy a satellite already in orbit
where it had no involvement whatsoever with the launch thereof (for example, buying a
satellite from a US competitor that had procured its launch from a US launch service provider, launching from a US facility on US territory).135 Under its own law, France would
impose the obligation upon Eutelsat to obtain a license for operating that satellite after
hand-over, including the obligation to indemnify the French government in “the case of . . .
damage caused after the launching phase” up to a certain maximum.136
4.2.5. Private Operators as Victims of Damage
On the “victim-side,” read “claimant-side” of liability, the primary focus of the Liability
Convention on states was logically reflected in a total absence of jus standi for private operators—at least under the Convention itself. Any claim for damage, even if sustained by
a private operator (for example, if its satellite would be damaged by fragments of another
space object), would require a state to take it up. Here, the Convention firstly provides for
the state of nationality of the operator, secondly (if the aforementioned state choose not to
assert a claim) the state where the damage was sustained (of course presuming it a different state than the first-mentioned), and thirdly (if neither of the aforementioned states has
chosen to assert a claim) the state whose “permanent residents” had sustained the damage
(presuming again this to be a state different from the previous one(s)).137
With a view to juridical persons such as private operators of communication satellites,
however, the following caveats regarding the application of these clauses are due. As to the
second option of a state taking up the cause of a private operator, it should be noted that
the most likely cases of damage being suffered by a private operator as caused by an(other)
space object (and hence falling within the scope of the Liability Convention) would be to
its own satellite in outer space, meaning this option essentially becomes useless: outer
space is not the “territory” of any state in the legal sense of the word.138
Furthermore, the third option seems to focus largely on natural persons, which is in any
event where the notion of a “permanent resident,” entitling the state concerned to the exercise of diplomatic protection such as by taking up an international claim on its behalf, is
becoming an increasingly accepted concept.139 Even if it were to be applied here to private
companies as well, the notion of “permanent residence” in the context of a company logically speaking would point at its main seat of business operations, which is its headquarters (unless a ground station for satellite control as such would be deemed to qualify)—
which in turn, under general public international law, co-determines the nationality of the
company140 (together with the law of incorporation), bringing analysis back to the first option.
In short: it would essentially be the state of nationality which is to take up the cause of
a private satellite operator in the context of an international liability dispute under the Liability Convention. Questions may then arise to what extent domestic provisions, either
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by national law or by applicable licenses, deal with the rights and interests of private operators to see their cause being properly taken up by their state of nationality, for example
by a right to be consulted and/or present at relevant proceedings. The Liability Convention, being an international public law treaty, remains completely silent on those issues.
It should be noted that nothing in the Liability Convention precludes a private operator
from pursuing its own claims in other forums at its disposal, notably those of the launching
state.141 There may be several valid reasons for doing so: apart from the dependency upon
a private operator’s state of nationality which recourse to the Liability Convention’s system requires, private claims in a court would lead to a binding judgement,142 may cost
considerably less in terms of time and funds, and may (at least in certain jurisdictions) lead
to substantially larger amounts of compensation than an international decision. To that
extent, the Liability Convention is merely an additional tool for relevant states to arrive at
compensation for damage sustained by themselves and/ or natural or juridical persons.
4.3. The “Boundary” Issue under the Liability Convention
The Liability Convention, like the Rescue Agreement, defines IGOs essentially in an indirect manner, through its repeated references to states members of that organization and
their fundamental role in the context of the secondary personality these IGOs can enjoy
under the Convention. In other words: for the purposes of the Liability Convention the key
defining factor of an ISO is again its being composed of a number of sovereign states, as
this already followed from the Outer Space Treaty’s relevant provisions.
Moreover, there is no proper definition of private operators, but following the Outer
Space Treaty’s lead clearly Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat qualify as such for the purpose
of the Liability Convention, and will of necessity implicate their respective states in any
case where damage would be caused by or to their operations.
Crossing the threshold from ISOs to private companies, therefore, means that henceforth Inmarsat requires a license from the UK authorities which, inter alia, deals with the
potential for the United Kingdom to be held liable as a consequence of Inmarsat’s procurement of launches, and generally speaking ensure control of the respective authorities over
the technical, operational, economic, social, and ecological quality of the activities.143
Similarly, Eutelsat would be faced with liability reimbursement arrangements as part
of its license, as a consequence of the reference of the French Law on space activities to
compensation possibly due under (Article VI of the) Outer Space Treaty in conjunction
with its reference to licensing obligations for any operations in space and (limits to) indemnification under such a license also for damage caused after the launch phase has ended.144
Only in the case of Intelsat, as seen, the imposition of international third-party liability
arrangements through the license (which license itself was suggested by Article VI of the
Outer Space Treaty and obligatory under the Commercial Space Launch Act) would be
unlikely.145 Apparently, the US authorities do not consider mere operations of Intelsat involving its satellites and causing damage to possibly give rise to claims for compensation
as part of reparation for internationally wrongful acts involving such damage under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.
Whether the position on this legal matter of the United Kingdom and France or conversely that of the United States will prevail and become the generally accepted one at the

19

VON DER

DUNK, CROSSING A RUBYCON? (2013)

end of the day will only be decided either when further international legal discussion (presumably in the UNCOPUOS context) would lead to an unequivocal understanding on the
scope of the international responsibility and liability of Articles VI and VII of the Outer
Space Treaty and of the Liability Convention or upon the first decision by an international
court or tribunal in a concrete legal dispute on the issue.
Crossing the threshold from ISO to private operator finally also meant that, henceforth,
all three operators would depend upon their respective states of nationality only in case
they would suffer damage and would like to use the Liability Convention to get such damage compensated. If, for whatever reason, the United States, the United Kingdom, or
France would not consider taking up a case under the Liability Convention on behalf of
Intelsat, Inmarsat, or Eutelsat for damage caused to their respective satellites, the only option left to those private operators might well be to sue in a private capacity in the courts
of (presumably) the (or a) launching state.146
5. The Registration Convention and Private Operators
5.1. Intergovernmental Organizations and the Registration Convention
The Registration Convention, tied most closely to the Liability Convention already in terms
of substance—the former’s regime for registration of space objects was developed to a large
extent to enhance the chances of identifying the liable entity or entities for the purposes of
the latter147—follows the same path when it comes to providing IGOs with their own status. Also the Registration Convention was designed largely to elaborate one article of the
Outer Space Treaty, in this case Article VIII, providing for the general concept of registering a space object and the possibility to exercise jurisdiction over it for the registering
state.148
Article VII(1) of the Registration Convention provides for the same three criteria for an
IGO to become a de facto party to its regime (partisanship of the majority of its members to
the Registration Convention, partisanship of the majority of its members to the Outer Space
Treaty, and a formal declaration) as well as for the same limitation to such partisanship of
the IGO (namely, to the Articles dealing with substantive rights and obligations only).149
The result of application of the Registration Convention to an IGO having made the
declaration concerned—which did not apply to INTELSAT, INMARSAT, or EUTELSAT,
and currently does not apply to ITSO, IMSO, or EUTELSAT IGO—is that such an IGO
could now officially act as registration entity of its own satellites (or other space objects) in
conformity with its provisions. At the same time, the inherent limitations to applying the
registration concept to IGOs becomes apparent in dealing with the major legal consequence of registration: the possibility to exercise jurisdiction, on a quasi-territorial basis as
it were, over the space object so registered.150 Obviously, an IGO cannot exercise jurisdiction in the sense of public international law, so the question would be who could do so over
a space object registered by an IGO, as it were in its stead or on its behalf.151
Here the only clue the Registration Convention provides is that “where there are two or
more launching States in respect of any such space object, they shall jointly determine
which one of them shall register the object in accordance with paragraph I of this article,
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bearing in mind the provisions of article VIII of the [Outer Space] Treaty . . . without prejudice to appropriate agreements concluded or to be concluded among the launching States
on jurisdiction and control over the space object and over any personnel thereof.”152 This
clause, obviously, is targeted at cases where two or more states qualify as launching states,
where the main rationale is to preclude as far as possible conflicts of jurisdiction between
several states.
A similar scenario however would arise where an IGO qualifies as a “launching state”
for the purpose of the Registration Convention, since in the absence of any further regulation all member states of that IGO, or at least those that are themselves parties to the Registration Convention—essentially regardless of whether in addition such states themselves
would qualify as “launching states”—might claim to exercise jurisdiction over the space
object registered by “their” IGO. So, it would be appropriate to apply the same rationale,
as further corroborated by Article XIII of the Outer Space Treaty,153 and hence essentially
the same principle, in that “appropriate agreements” can or should be concluded among
the states concerned “on jurisdiction and control over the space object and over any personnel thereof,” to use the phrases of the Registration Convention.154 Presumably, such
“appropriate agreements” would be part of the IGO’s internal statutes, or being adopted
under those.
Obviously, with none of the three IGOs currently under consideration either in their old
or in their new manifestation having declared their acceptance of the rights and obligations
under the Convention, all this has so far remained theory.
5.2. Private Operators and the Registration Convention
As for Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat, the main point of note is that the registration of
satellites launched for either of them under the Registration Convention is not (necessarily
or automatically) for respectively the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to
undertake; that almost exclusively depends upon what extent these three states qualify as
“launching states” for those satellites.
This would unequivocally be the case, for example, for the United States if an Intelsat
satellite would be launched from a US launch site or territory, or by NASA or the US Air
Force.155 If, by contrast, that satellite would be launched by a Soyuz vehicle from Bajkonour,
the only legal link between the Intelsat-owned and -operated satellite and the United States
would be Intelsat’s nationality as per its administrative and operational headquarters—a
concept which does not figure as such in the definition of the launching state.
There would be one scenario however in this example under which the United States
might still play the role of state of registry under the Registration Convention by qualifying
as a “launching state.” This depends on the extent to which the second criterion for becoming a launching state, that of “procuring” the launch, is interpreted as including cases
where a state’s national (for instance a company with its nationality) procures the launch
itself, as opposed to only dealing with cases where “A State . . . procures the launching of
a space object.”156 As there is no general agreement on the international level regarding the
precise scope of the notion of “procurement,” not even among individual experts,157 states
have picked their own choice as to such interpretation, even if largely “unconsciously,” by
applying their respective licensing obligation and requirements regarding liability—where
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the concept of the “launching state” was first developed—and registration to one or the
other category of private actors.
Starting again with the example of Intelsat, the United States under the Commercial
Space Launch Act does not require a license with the attendant reimbursement and insurance obligations as discussed158 for operators procuring a launch on a non-US launcher
from non-US soil, whereas the Communications Act’s licensing system only refers to those
intending to “use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications or signals by radio” on US territory—yet does not contain any relevant liability or
insurance requirements. From this, it should be deduced that the United States at least
implicitly does not consider itself a “launching state” for the purpose of either Liability or
Registration Convention on the mere premise of a private operator with its nationality procuring the launch in question. At least, it would find a strong argument in denying any
liability or obligation to register in respect of such satellite should a legal dispute on this
ever come to an international court, tribunal, or Claims Commission.159
It should be added, that in the United States there is no statutory registration of space
objects which might shed further light on this issue. So far, the State Department takes care
of such registration as necessary, based on information provided by other branches of the
US government and referring in this context to “the official U.S. Registry of Space Objects
Launched into Outer Space.”160 The Federal Aviation Administration in turn is then required to assist the State Department in ensuring licensees will provide the appropriate
information, which applies to “all objects placed in space by a licensed launch.”161
Interestingly, for Inmarsat as a UK company the situation is different, as the UK Outer
Space Act does require an operator with UK nationality procuring a launch to obtain a license, and this cannot but lead to the conclusion that the United Kingdom would consider
itself a “launching state,” and would feel itself obliged either to register the satellite at issue
itself (in case the United Kingdom would be the only state qualifying as “launching state”)
or to make sure some state does so in conjunction with other launching states, in case it is
not itself the only one qualifying as such—for example, if the actual launch of the satellite
would be undertaken by a Soyuz from the Russian facilities at Bajkonour.162
The UK Outer Space Act also specifically provides that “[t]he Secretary of State shall
maintain a register of space objects” and that “[t]here shall be entered in the register such
particulars of such space objects as the Secretary of State considers appropriate to comply
with the international obligations of the United Kingdom,” thus leaving the matter essentially undecided to what categories of private satellite operators that Convention would
actually apply.163
In the case of Eutelsat, the French national space law likewise calls for a license for those
operators of French nationality that wish to procure a launch and/or operate a satellite
launched elsewhere. Yet, as the law on space activities also specifically refers not only to
the Liability Convention but also to the Outer Space Treaty, the need for a license in the
scenarios referred to may not be concluded automatically to confirm France’s perception
of being liable—to the extent the licensing obligation would be following from Article VI
of the Outer Space Treaty, it would rather qualify France as a responsible state.
It should nevertheless be assumed that the French law does not deviate more than
strictly necessary from the terms of the Liability and Registration Conventions, to both of
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which France is a party of long standing.164 Therefore, it should also be assumed that those
cases for a license obligation that match the criterion of a launching state for liability purposes will be those used in the Liability Convention—and hence be identical to those of
the Registration Convention.165
On registration itself finally, the French law simply calls for registration “in the event
France has a registration obligation according to Article II” of the Registration Convention,
without specifying or indicating how France itself envisions the scope of that Article with
a view, for example, to private satellites and/or the operations conducted with them.166
5.3. The “Boundary” Issue under the Registration Convention
As a consequence of the above, the transition from ISO to private operator has had varying
consequences as far as the Registration Convention is concerned. In the ISO context registration of satellites was rather straightforward, any member state being able to register on
behalf of the ISO as being a state “procuring” the launch of that satellite through the “vehicle” of the ISO.167 Following the transition, however, for Inmarsat and Eutelsat the situation became even more straightforward, with the United Kingdom considering itself to be
a “launching state” for any satellite the launch of which was procured by Inmarsat, and
hence tasked to ensure proper registration, and the same applying mutatis mutandis to
France and Eutelsat; whereas in the case of Intelsat the state or states entitled and obliged
to realize registration might more readily differ from case to case and might not even necessarily include the United States.
6. UNGA Resolution 37/92 and Private Operators
6.1. Intergovernmental Organizations and the UNGA Resolution
The UN Resolution dealing with international direct television broadcasting,168 being a
Resolution of the UN General Assembly, is not a binding legal document akin to a treaty.169
Also, the fact that it was not adopted by consensus but by a vote with most of the states of
the developed world abstaining or voting against it denies the Resolution the status as
being reflective of customary international law—with the exception perhaps of those states
that voted in favor.170 Thus, the substantive core of the Resolution, the perceived requirement of “prior consent,” does not generally speaking apply to Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat, the post-ISO-privatization operators, since neither the United States, nor the United
Kingdom, nor France, the respective host states of those privatized entities, are among the
states voting in favor of the Resolution.171
The UN Resolution makes reference to intergovernmental organizations exactly once,
in stating that “[w]hen international direct television broadcasting by satellite is carried
out by an international intergovernmental organisation, the responsibility referred to in
paragraph 8 above should be borne both by that organisation and by the States participating in it.”172 Paragraph 8 in turn, as will be seen, simply restates the general state responsibility for space activities as already posited by Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty for the
specific context concerned.
As the Resolution also explicitly considers the activities it deals with to be subject to the
Outer Space Treaty,173 these paragraphs simply confirm the ultimate responsibility of UN
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member states for compliance with the Resolution’s principles in cases where intergovernmental organizations that those states are members of undertake the broadcasting activities at issue. This, of course, would only be the case to the extent those principles can be
considered binding for any individual state concerned, either because it has voted in favor
or because a certain obligation could be considered to reflect customary international law
(or both). Further analysis might be required as regards the question whether that would
actually apply to (a majority) of the member states of ITSO, IMSO, and/or EUTELSAT IGO.
6.2. Private Operators and UNGA Resolution37/92
The key provision in the Resolution regarding private operators is to be found in the aforementioned Paragraph 8, stating that “States should bear international responsibility for
activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite carried out
by them or under their jurisdiction and for the conformity of any such activities with the
principles set forth in this document.”174
Thus representing a specific application of the general state responsibility principle of
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, the activities of any operator under the jurisdiction of
a state should trigger the responsibility of that state just as if it concerned its own activities.
The main difference with the formulation of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty from that
perspective lies in the use of the “classic” international law-phrase “under the jurisdiction”
instead of the reference to “national activities” that Article VI uses. Thus, the formulation
of Paragraph 8 seems more clear in that this would normally refer to both territorial jurisdiction and jurisdiction over nationals.175
In the specific cases of Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat, there should be little doubt that
(at least) the United States, the United Kingdom and France respectively are internationally responsible for their activities with a view to the Resolution’s terms. Since, however,
as indicated, neither of these three states have voted in favor of the Resolution when it was
enunciated in 1982, nor have they ever since given evidence of a change of legal views in
this regard, the three private satellite operators currently under scrutiny would only have
to comply with those principles pronounced by the UN Resolution which would reflect
customary international law or would otherwise be binding upon them.176
6.3. The “Boundary” Issue under UNGA Resolution 37/92
In view of the above, the transition from ISOs to private operators operating under a limited supervision regime of revamped IGOs did not give rise to a major difference with
regard to the legal obligations resting upon, or legal rights bestowed upon, the entities in
question. At most it could be said at this point that the former operational ISOs would
more likely have been required to operate in conformity with all the principles throughout—but essentially for political reasons: because a major portion of member states would
have voted themselves in favor of the Resolution and would be willing to impose the consequences of strictly abiding by its terms as if it concerned a binding treaty, in many instances it would have been practically impossible for the ISOs to overstep those terms.
The general lack of willingness on the part of the United States, United Kingdom, and
France to consider the principles (or at least some of them) valid legal rules, by contrast,
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might have led to the privatized operators being much less likely to be held to the principles provided by the Resolution. The final answer to that issue, however, would require
an analysis of the respective licenses, where the authorities concerned would (or at least
should) have taken care to somehow reflect those principles they would consider binding
(as a matter of customary law) whilst omitting any of those they would not consider valid
legal rules.
It may be noted finally that the various legal documents allowing the respective supervisory IGOs to force compliance of the private operators do not even explicitly refer to
international law, only to the core respectively basic principles which the operators should
comply with,177 which essentially begs the question again to what extent there would be
customary international law rules incorporated in the Resolution which ipso facto would
be applicable also to the activities of the operators.
7. The ITU Framework and Private Operators
7.1. The ITU Framework and Satellite Operators
The framework regime, based upon the ITU Constitution and ITU Convention, using the
ITU with its competencies and capacities as the principal instrument to deal with the most
important aspects of international telecommunications, is—of course—by far the most important element of the international legal environment for conducting satellite communications, whether by way of hybrid public consortia such as the old INTELSAT, INMARSAT,
or EUTELSAT, or through privatized operators such as Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat, to
the extent supervised by the new IGOs ITSO, IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO.
The present chapter does not profess to treat any part of that subject in any detail, but
merely represents an effort to highlight one particular element thereof.178 As indicated, the
focus here is namely on the principled legal differences between intergovernmental organizations and private operators, and an analysis of the international space law treaties (and
the one UN Resolution dedicated to satellite communications) on this particular issue
without at least a summary comparative look at the ITU framework would make little
sense.
7.2. Intergovernmental Organizations, Private Operators, and the ITU Framework
For the above purpose, it suffices to revisit the key mechanism for dealing with potential
problems of satellite communications in the international environment, which is that of the
coordination of frequencies and, indirectly, orbits.179 The ITU framework, developed in its
most original version almost a century and a half ago, for a long time has remained even
more exclusively state-oriented than the UN space treaties, and this also transpires fundamentally in the aforementioned coordination process.
When states are intent on operating a satellite and on assuring the communication operations of that satellite, the process of coordination essentially consists of two steps. The
first step involves the allocation of frequency bands to categories of communications services—or in the language of the Radio Regulations: “allocation (of a frequency band): Entry
in the Table of Frequency Allocations of a given frequency band for the purpose of its use
by one or more terrestrial or space radio communication services or the radio astronomy
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service under specified conditions. This term shall also be applied to the frequency band
concerned.”180 These allocations normally take place at the World Radio Conferences
which are regularly held every two or three years, where the ITU member states collectively decide on new allocations, or changes or deletions of existing allocations, based on
the perceived global and general need of specific services (satellite as well as non-satellite)
to be able to use radiofrequencies for their services—and of course on their lobbying and
negotiating skills.181
Once a frequency band is allocated to a certain category of satellite services, it is open
for specific requests by individual states to be granted interference-free use of specific frequencies for uplink, downlink, and wherever applicable, inter-satellite-link purposes.
Those individual requests can be forwarded to the ITU’s Radio Regulations Board182 at any
moment a state has decided to go forward with a specific satellite project, the so-called
“notification.” Notification then kicks off an elaborate and often quite prolonged coordination process in order to ascertain that the new proposed satellite operation will not risk
interfering with existing or previously notified requests for frequencies.183
The ultimate aim of the notification and coordination process is to arrive at the second
step, the allotment of specific frequencies to the particular notified service, also in case of satellite services—or to use the language of the Radio Regulations again: “allotment (of a radio frequency or radio frequency channel): Entry of a designated frequency channel in an
agreed plan, adopted by a competent conference, for use by one or more administrations
for a terrestrial or space radiocommunication service in one or more identified countries
or geographical areas and under specified conditions.”184
The reference to “administrations” as the entities entitled to the use of an allotted frequency (and therefore also the ones entitled to request allotment) is critical, since this term
refers exclusively to relevant state organs: an administration is defined as “any governmental department or service responsible for discharging the obligations undertaken in the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, in the Convention of the International
Telecommunication Union and in the Administrative Regulations.”185
Thus, neither intergovernmental organizations nor private operators have any formal
independent say in either the allocation process or the allotment process, or can even request for allotment at the ITU level. Both essentially are treated equal in this respect, in
that a third step, of assignment, becomes necessary. “Assignment” is defined as “authorisation given by an administration for a radio station to use a radio frequency or radio frequency channel under specified conditions,”186 formally speaking following the allotment
of that frequency to the state whose administration is referenced.
As such, both ISOs and private satellite operators require one state firstly to go through
the allotment process, and, where necessary prior to that, the allocation process, and secondly to then assign the frequencies ultimately so allotted to them in order to be able to
use them under the ITU system.
The omission of intergovernmental or private operators from the key formal decisionmaking processes within the ITU was not an oversight or neglected relic. ITU member
states are explicitly held internationally responsible for telecommunication activities by
entities “authorised by them to establish and operate telecommunications and which en-
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gage in international services or which operate stations capable of causing harmful interference to the radio services of other countries.”187 This provision literally refers to “operating agencies,” so as to include both public and private operators, to the extent the former
are not yet covered by the same obligation of Article 6(1), applicable to the member states
themselves. An “operating agency” is defined in the Annex to the ITU Constitution as
“[a]ny individual, company, corporation or governmental agency,” and should for the present analysis be read as including an “international (multi) government agency.”188
While in more recent times the limited status of non-states in the ITU has started to
evolve—for example, at the Kyoto Conference of 1994 by means of an amendment to the
ITU Convention the possibility for nongovernmental entities to participate as “small-m”
members was allowed, providing them with the right of access to all relevant information
as well as consultation; and at the Minneapolis Plenipotentiary Conference of 1998 they
were allowed to achieve a status of “Sector members,” allowing for full-blown participation at the ITU sector level189—states remain the only full members of the organization
represented on the Council, the highest decision-making body of the ITU.190
7.3. The “Boundary” Issue under the ITU Framework, as Far as Frequency Notification
and Coordination Is Concerned
The only distinction between ISOs and private satellite operators in terms of obtaining a
nominal guarantee of interference-free usage of usable frequencies from the ITU lies in the
fact that, for IGOs, any member state of that IGO could propose allocation of frequency
bands if needed and request allotment of specific frequencies effectively on behalf of that
IGO. For a private operator there could usually be only one administration undertaking
those efforts: that of the state of nationality (that is, incorporation and headquarters) of the
company concemed.191
In practice, not even that distinction may have mattered much. In the cases of the old
INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT, for obvious reasons of efficiency and coherence,
the task of taking up the interests of these IGOs in the ITU context was delegated to the
host state of the organization—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, respectively, precisely the states that post-privatization would continue to do the same on behalf
of respectively Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Eutelsat. Even the inherent support including, where
necessary, votes in favor of the other member states of INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT in the ITU decision making processes, for respective US, UK, or French efforts
would normally not be lacking in the case of the private operators due to the existence of
ITSO, IMSO, and EUTELSAT IGO, respectively, whose member states should still be generally interested in seeing the private operators succeed.
8. Concluding Remarks
Perhaps surprisingly, the overall conclusions regarding the privatization process under
the four space treaties, the UN Resolution, and the ITU regime are that the specific consequences of transformation from an intergovernmental organization to a private operator
summarily supervised by a scaled-down intergovernmental overseer are actually relatively marginal, and often more of a formal nature or leading to practical differences of
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handling the various interests involved than that there is any fundamental legal paradigmshift to be noted.
In the final analysis, however, there is more to it than that. It is true, that even under the
four space treaties, the apparent recognition of IGOs as a special type of entity, upon closer
analysis, did not provide them much of a legal status and role as independent from their
member states. Ultimately, states would always remain responsible and liable under the
Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention for activities of ISOs in case first-option dealings with the ISOs directly would somehow not work out to the satisfaction of the third
parties invoking such responsibility or liability. Still, at least a considerable incentive was
provided to prearrange internally for procedures of handling ISO liabilities—in terms of
general need, similar, but in terms of structure, scope, and substance quite different from
the incentive for states to draft national space legislation including licensing regimes handling private operator liabilities.
For example, global public interests in satellite communications would be much more
likely to be ignored or neglected in a context where a single state would determine the
legal parameters for an operator’s activities than in a context where a multiplicity of states
would be involved in determining that framework. Conversely, the latter would have been
much less likely to adapt to a rapidly changing technological, economic and social environment.
Also the seemingly independent ability to register satellites under the Registration Convention as an ISO—an option, it should be added, never used by INTELSAT, INMARSAT,
EUTELSAT, ITSO, IMSO, or EUTELSAT IGO—would still require the member states of
such organization to take care of the most prominent consequence of registration of a space
object: the direct entitlement under Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Registration Convention to exercise jurisdiction and control over the satellite at issue. In that
sense, the reality of the state-orientation of the space treaties as to a large extent still being
devolved from general international public law, could not be overcome by the space treaties on their own account.
As a result, ISOs in the formal legal sense were (almost) as dependent on their member
states as private space operators were on “their” state. In both cases it is such a state, after
all, which is to be held responsible and liable under key provisions of, in particular, the
Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention.
UN Resolution 37/92 and the element of the ITU framework discussed here do not even
make that much of a theoretical distinction between an intergovernmental and a private
operator, hence making the difference between the pre-privatization and post-privatization
at least in terms of structural, formal, and theoretical application once more largely negligible.
The major exception worthy of note might operate more at an overarching abstract level
of legal development than at the level of the operators themselves. The aforementioned
“explicitization” of the general public duties for the privatized satellite operators by means
of Public Service Agreements as noted constitutes an important measure of “juridification”
of the operations of satellite operators, the consequence of the cross-over from ISO to private operator. This has equivalents in other areas as well—for example, to comply with the
requirements of the Registration Convention, the registration of satellites now requires a
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formalized domestic legal process instead of a political decision taken within an IGO structure, and essentially the same applies to the handling of the potential liabilities resulting
from their operations under the Liability Convention in terms of now-explicit obligations
to arrange appropriate insurance.
This in turn may lead to increasing diversification, as for example Eutelsat is being subjected to registration requirements even beyond the ones provided in the Registration Convention, and all three private operators are handled differently when it comes to dealing
with the domestic consequences of liability under the Liability Convention. Prior to privatization, the ISOs operated more or less directly under the aegis of the Liability Convention, even if INTELSAT and INMARSAT had not made a declaration under Article XXII
and also the declaration of EUTELSAT did not cause it to obtain much of a status independent from its member states. Through those member states, liability applied in accordance to the terms of the Liability Convention without further ado except for those formal
jus standi issues. Following privatization, however, with the intermittence of domestic laws
to regulate the specific liabilities of the operators, licenses could be mandated for varying
activities (such as procurement in the UK case), liabilities could become limited, insurance
could be made obligatory and specific obligations could be established which had never
been considered under the Liability Convention (such as in the French case with product
liability).
From a different angle therefore, a major result of the privatization of the ISOs was a
fragmentation and diversification of the legal framework(s) within which they had to operate. Further to this, and partly as a consequence thereof, the main differences between
pre-privatization and post-privatization will lie in the application in practice, both administratively speaking and politically speaking, of the legal regimes discussed.
In the international arena, the private operators will have to count on their host states
to a much greater extent than the ISOs used to do, for even if they still could avail themselves of support from ITSO, IMSO, or EUTELSAT IGO, these IGOs obviously have only a
specific and limited interest in the operators’ activities, resulting in limited responsibilities
and even more limited liabilities. After all, the whole idea behind the privatization process
was that, apart from some public duties which should remain guaranteed, the operators
should act under as much commercial freedom as possible, meaning that the new IGOs
might be less broadly and actively interested in the success of the particular operator they
were supervising. Consequently, private operators have to look to their national authorities for issues of recovery of damages under the Liability Convention or for satellites to be
recovered under the Rescue Agreement, which thereby becomes a matter of national law.
This opens the door to diversification of applicable regimes, unless the inherent global
character of the satellite communications market serves as a force promoting international
harmonization.
In the last resort, therefore, the Rubycon crossed by the privatization of the ISOs indeed
was more of a practical, economic, and political character than of a strictly speaking legal
character, although the legal framework did—apart from reflecting the relevant practical,
economic, and political paradigm changes—result in a juridification of the regimes and in
considerably more precision regarding the allocation of responsibilities and liabilities.
Also, as a consequence of the fact that the Rubycon was crossed, so to speak, at different
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fords by INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT, the general legal framework was seen
to diversify and fragment considerably. From that perspective there is no doubt that also
legally speaking the world of international satellite communications has changed profoundly following the privatization of these three ISOs.
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